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GRAND JURY: A PROSECUTOR NEED NOT
PRESENT EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
American prosecutors must perform two often conflicting duties.
They must obtain criminal convictions' yet provide fair treatment for
persons suspected of crimes.2 The tension between prosecutorial duties
frequently arises when a prosecutor selectively presents evidence to a
grand jury.' By controlling what a grand jury sees and hears, a skillful
prosecutor can often ensure indictment of a prospective defendant.' A
prosecutor's discretionary power raises the question whether a pro-
secutor has an ethical or legal obligation to divulge exculpatory evidence
to a grand jury.'
An analysis of a prosecutor's duty to divulge must acknowledge the
unique status of the grand jury in American jurisprudence.' According
to tradition, grand juries originated with the English King Henry II's
Assize of Clarendon in 1166.' Grand juries were originally revenue-
J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY xv (1980).
2 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110-11 (1976); Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78, 88 (1935); A.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 7-13
(1979) (public prosecutor must seek justice, not only convictions).
' See generally SECTION ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE A.B.A., FEDERAL GRAND
JURY HANDBOOK (1959?) [hereinafter cited as GRAND JURY HANDBOOK]; Spain, The Grand
Jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 119 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Spain].
' Address by Chief Judge William J. Campbell, Conference of Metropolitan Chief
District Judges of the Federal Judicial Center, reprinted in 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972). See
also 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 6.02(1)(b) (1976 & Supp. 1980) (grand jury primarily a
law enforcement agency).
I Several nationally recognized prosecution standards direct prosecutors to divulge
exculpatory information to grand juries. See A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3.6(b) (Approved Draft 1971) (prosecutor
should disclose to grand jury any evidence that he knows will tend to negate guilt); NA-
TIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard
14.2(D) (1977) (prosecutor should disclose to grand jury any evidence tending to negate guilt
or preclude finding of indictment).
The United States Attorney's Manual states that although neither statutory nor case
law require a prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, the Justice
Department's internal policy requires disclosure under many circumstances. When a federal
prosecutor is personally aware of substantial evidence directly negating the guilt of the ac-
cused, for example, the prosecutor must offer the information to the grand jury. U.S. DEP'T
OF JUST., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-11,334 (1977). See also SECTION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A.B.A., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION POLICY ON THE GRAND JURY, Princi-
ple 3 (1977) (no prosecutor shall knowingly fail to disclose to grand jury evidence that will
substantially tend to negate guilt).
See United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
825 (1977). The grand jury originated before the adoption of the Constitution. Id. Because of
the grand jury's preconstitutional status, the grand jury is theoretically independent of any
governmental branch. Id.
1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321 (1931); T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 110 (4th ed. 1948).
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producing devices and counters to the dominance of ecclesiastical
courts! Eventually, however, the grand jury evolved into a citizen's
safeguard against the excesses of royal power.' In the United States,
this protection appears in the fifth amendment, which requires that a
grand jury's indictment or presentment initiate a federal criminal pro-
secution."0 Many states also begin prosecution with a grand jury's indict-
ment."1
The grand jury's primary role is to assess the State's evidence
against a suspect to determine whether probable cause exists to place
him on trial for a crime.2 Grand juries traditionally conduct their pro-
ceedings in secret. 3 To establish probable cause sufficient to warrant in-
dictment, the State need not prove a suspect's guilt by a preponderance
of the evidence or demonstrate that his guilt is "more likely than not."'4
' See Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 701, 704 (1972). At the time Henry II established grand juries, only litigants who
could afford to pay for favorable decisions prevailed in court. Id. When he established grand
juries, Henry directed both judicially imposed fines and bribery away from ecclesiastical
courts and into his own courts and coffers. Id. Moreover, criminal prosecution by indictment
or presentment prevented appeals to the Pope allowed by ecclesiastical courts. Id.
' The grand jury came to stand between a prosecutor and an accused and ensured that
the prosecution did not bring charges based on ill will or unbelievable testimony. See Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906); GRAND JURY HANDBOOK, note 3 supra, at 9.
' U.S. CONST. amend V. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]o per-
son shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury.. ." Id. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure con-
strue "otherwise infamous crime" as any crime punishable by more than a year's imprison-
ment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). An indictment is a formal grand jury charge in response to a
prosecutor's presentation of evidence. A presentment is similar to an indictment except
that a grand jury prepares a presentment on its own initiative. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1015 n.b (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
KAMISAR].
" See, e.g., ARK CONST. amend 21, § 1; CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; IOWA CONST. art. 1, §
11; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10; ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 7(a); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 12.7; COLO. R. CRIM. P.
7(a). Twenty states require that prosecution of all felonies be by indictment. KAMISAR, supra
note 10, at 1016. See, e.g., KY. CONST. § 12; MiSS. CONST. art. 3, § 27; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
601.1 (1974). See also L. KATZ, L. LITWIN & R. BAMBERGER, JUSTICE IS THE CRIME 247-365
(1972) (comprehensive state by state summary of pretrial procedure) [hereinafter cited as
JUSTICE IS THE CRIME]; Spain, supra note 3, at 126-42 (description of each state's criminal pro-
cedure); Note, Prosecutor's Duty to Expose Exculpatory Evidence to the Grand Jury, 27
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 580, 589 n.54 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Prosecutor's Duty].
" Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362-63 (1956); Bracy v. United States, 435
U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice).
,3 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1959); United
States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 (1958).
" Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is not a standard that can be defined with
quantitative precision. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
United States v. Texas Education Agency, 467 F.2d 848, 864 (1972), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Austin Ind. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). A litigant
carrying the burden of proving an assertion by a preponderance of the evidence must pre-
sent evidence to the factfinder that has a greater degree of credibility than the evidence
that the opposition presents. Merchant's Fast Motor Lines v. Lane, 259 F.2d 336, 339 n.2
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The prosecutor need only convince a grand jury that a trial on the
merits of the State's charge is reasonable.'5 As a practical matter, a pro-
secutor presents a charge for the grand jury's consideration only if his
case appears strong enough to convince a trial jury of a suspect's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.'6 An indictment that is unlikely to result in a
defendant's conviction is usually not worth a prosecutor's effort.
(5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959). The preponderance of evidence standard
also requires that the factfinder conclude that the assertions of the litigant with the burden
of proof are more probably true than false before the factfinder holds in the litigant's favor.
Porter v. American Export Lines, Inc., 387 F.2d 409, 411 (3rd Cir. 1968). The preponderance
of evidence standard of proof is less rigorous than the "clear, unequivocal, and convincing"
standard of evidence, United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 737 (1966); Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943), or the "beyond reasonable doubt" standard of
evidence. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314-15 (1979). See also E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 339 (2d ed. 1972) (discussion of various definitions of preponderance of
evidence standard). A standard requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence is iden-
tical to a standard requiring litigant to prove a state of facts that is "more likely than not."
Jones v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 474, 480-81 (E.D. La. 1965), aff'd without opinion, 358
F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1966).
" The Supreme Court has held that probable cause to restrain a suspect exists when
facts and circumstances in a case would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that a
suspect has committed an offense. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925). The
Court has not attempted to define probable cause more precisely since its Carroll opinion.
See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 n.4. (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). The Court
has used the phrases "reasonable cause" and "probable cause" interchangeably. Compare
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556 (1978) (reasonable cause) with id. at 557 (pro-
bable cause). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (probable cause a
standard for prudent men, not legal technicians); Montgomery v. Dennison, 363 Pa. 255,
-, 69 A.2d 520, 526 (1949) (probable cause for indictment when reasonable man considers
circumstances probative).
A grand juror need only hear enough inculpatory evidence to establish probable cause
for trial before deciding to indict a suspect. United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144
F.2d 604, 607 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 790 (1944). A grand jury member may choose to
indict even if the grand juror is absent when the prosecutor presents exculpatory evidence.
United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., No. 79-1677 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 1980). If
grand jurors can return an indictment even if they were absent when the prosecutor
presented exculpatory evidence, a requirement that the prosecutor present exculpatory
evidence seems. ill-founded.
6 See Keeny & Walsh, The American Bar Associaton's Grand Jury Principles: A
Critique From a Federal Criminal Justice Perspective, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 545, 548 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Keeney & Walsh]. Almost universally in common-law jurisdictions, a
court cannot find a defendant guilty of a crime unless a suspect's guilt is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). All American courts must adhere
to the reasonable doubt standard. Id at 364. The reasonable doubt standard requires a fact-
finder to reach a subjective state of near certitude of a suspect's guilt before returning a
guilty verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979). The Supreme Court has con-
sistently adhered to a reasonable doubt standard for criminal convictions. See, e.g., Patter-
son v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 685 (1975);
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312
(1880).
" But see generally Thaler, Punishing the Innocent The Need for Due Process and
the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 441 (indicted defendants
unlikely to reach trial because of plea bargaining). A "plea bargain" occurs when a defend-
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Because the grand jury is a non-adversarial forum which does not make
final judgments concerning a suspect's guilt,'8 a suspect in most jurisdic-
tions has no right to appear before a grand jury to present evidence on
his own behalf.'9 Moreover, a suspect may not cross-examine grand jury
witnesses." Thus, the prosecutor controls the nature and amount of in-
formation placed before a grand jury.
In Costello v. United States," the Supreme Court defined the scope
of the prosecutor's control over evidence before a grand jury. The Court
rejected petitioner Costello's argument that a court should dismiss an in-
dictment when the grand jury that returns the indictment considers only
hearsay testimony.2 The Costello Court held instead that a grand jury in-
dictment, regular on its face and returned by a legally constituted grand
jury, justifies a trial on the merits.2 The Court's rationale was simple.
Traditionally, grand juries could bring indictments or presentments
based exclusively on their personal knowledge of a suspect's criminal ac-
tivity.24 The fifth amendment carries the grand juries' historical in-
ant agrees to plead guilty to a crime in return for the prosecutor's promise to prosecute the
defendant for a lesser crime or to ask for a lighter sentence. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 69-71 (1977). The Supreme Court has formally approved plea bargaining. Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977). Prose-
cutors frequently conduct successful plea bargaining negotiations. 431 U.S. at 71. Given the
prevalence of plea bargaining, the possibility always exists that an unscrupulous prosecutor
might decline to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury in the hope of extracting a
guilty plea from an indicted suspect.
" United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 191 (1977) (dictum); United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974); United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., No.
79-1677 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 1980).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., No. 79-1677 (9th Cir.
Oct. 3, 1980) (suspect without right to appear before grand jury); United States v. Ciam-
brone, 601 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant without constitutional right to appear per-
sonally before grand jury); United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 339 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 861 (1975) (defendant without absolute right to appear before grand jury);
Sweeney v. Balkcom, 358 F.2d 415, 417 (5th Cir. 1966) (almost universally, accused without
right to appear before grand jury); Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790, -, 171 S.E.2d 501, 503
(1969), rev'd on other grounds, 408 U.S. 238 (1971) (because no right of confrontation until
trial, suspect without right to present defense to grand jury); State v. Morgan, 9 N.C. App.
624, -, 177 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1970), appeal dismissed, 277 N.C. 458, 178 S.E.2d 225 (1971)
(suspect without right, constitutional or otherwise, to appear before grand jury). See also 18
U.S.C. § 1504 (1976). A suspect may petition a federal grand jury for permission to appear
before the grand jury, but a person may not send a written communication to the grand jury
bearing on any matter under the grand jury's consideration. Id. But see GA. CODE ANN. §
89-9908 (1980) (right to grand jury hearing accorded to certain judges and county officials
before indictment for malfeasance or misfeasance in office); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1617 (1975)
(provisions of GA. CODE ANN. § 89-9908 (1980) extended to state officials).
' See, e.g., United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971, 980 (6th Cir. 1968), cert denied
sub nom. Strang v. United States, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
" 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
Id. at 363.
2 Id.
2 Id. at 362.
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dependence into modern federal practice.25 If grand juries can return in-
dictments based on no apparent evidence without courts' interference,
they may also return indictments based on evidence courts might con-
sider inadequate." By declining to set standards for the quality of
evidence a grand jury may consider, the Court established a discourag-
ing precedent for those who insist that a prosecutor must divulge ex-
culpatory evidence to grand juriesY Since Costello suggests that an in-
dictment is valid regardless of the amount of evidence that the grand
jury considers, an indictment can hardly be invalid when a prosecutor
omits exculpatory evidence from the grand jury's consideration.
Courts requiring divulgence of exculpatory evidence to grand juries
circumvent the Costello holding on two grounds. A few state courts con-
strue statutes to require divulgence.28 Some federal courts require
divulgence pursuant to their supervisory power to prevent prosecutorial
25 id.
2 Id. at 363.
= Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), has either implicitly or explicitly con-
trolled the decisions of several courts. See, e.g., United States v. Leverage Funding
Systems, Inc., No. 79-1677 (9th Cir. Oct. 3, 1980) (prosecutor under no duty to offer evidence
to grand jury that might negate suspect's guilt); United States v. Lasky, 600 F.2d 765, 768
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); United States v. Smith, 595 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Romero, 585 F.2d 391, 399 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
935 (1979); United States v. Thompson, 576 F.2d 784, 786 (9th Cir. 1978) (grand jury need not
be advised of all matters bearing on the credibility of potential witnesses); United States v.
Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978) (Government under
no duty to present to grand jury evidence bearing on credibility of witness); United States
v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir. 1976) (prosecution not required to present grand
jury with evidence that would tend to negate guilt); United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d 1133,
1136 (6th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976) (defendant not entitled to challenge in-
dictment on ground that information allegedly favorable to the defense was not presented
to grand jury); United States v. Gardner, 516 F.2d 334, 338-39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 861 (1975) (Government need not produce evidence before grand jury the undermines
credibility of government witnesses); Jack v. United States, 409 F.2d 522, 523-24 (9th Cir.
1969) (Government not required to undermine credibility of grand jury witnesses); Loraine
v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968) (prosecutor
need not present grand jury with evidence tending to undermine testimony of witnesses
before grand jury); United States v. Nelson, 486 F. Supp. 464, 475 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (prose-
cution not obligated to present to grand jury information favorable to defendant); United
States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (prosecutor not obligated to inform
grand jury of facts that might form basis for defense at trial); United States v. Addonizio,
313 F. Supp. 486, 495 (D.N.J. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 936 (1972) (prosecutor clearly not required to place all evidence in prosecution's
possession before grand jury).
28 See Frink v. State, 597 P.2d 154, 164-65 (Alaska 1979) (construing ALASKA R. CRIM.
P. 6(q)); Gieffels v. State, 590 P.2d 55, 59 (Alaska 1979) (dictum construing ALASKA R. CRIM.
P. 6(q)); Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 248, 250, 539 P.2d 792, 793, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32,
33 (1975) (construing CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1970)); State v. Herrera, 93 N.M. 442,
__ 601 P.2d 75, 77 (1979) (construing § 31-6-10 N.M.S.A. (1978)) (opinion superseded by §
31-6-11(B), N.M.S.A. (1978) (Cum. Supp. 1979), requiring a prosecutor to divulge exculpatory
evidence to a grand jury); State v. Harwood, 609 P.2d 1312, 1317 (Ore. 1980) (dictum constru-
ing O.R.S. § 132.390 (1977)).
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misconduct, 9 even though the Costello opinion specifically refers to a
federal indictment.0 Among state courts, the California Supreme Court
took the lead in construing statutes to require divulgence. In Johnson v.
Superior Court,3' the court construed a section of the California Penal
Code which requires grand juries to order presentation of evidence they
believe might exonerate a defendant.2 The court interpreted the statute
to impose an implied duty on a prosecutor to divulge exculpatory infor-
mation despite the absence of a grand jury's request.3 The Johnson opin-
ion offered no legislative history to support the court's construction of
the statute, but reasoned that grand juries cannot request exculpatory
evidence when they are unaware that such evidence is available. 4 The
court required prosecutorial divulgence to ensure that a grand jury's
knowledge of exculpatory evidence at least equals that of the pro-
secutor.3 - Only a few states have followed California's lead,36 although
" See United States v. Martin, 480 F. Supp. 880, 886 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (indictment
dismissed because prosecutor forced grand jury to act quickly but did not reveal
prosecutor's motive behind rapid indictment); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1353
(N.D. Ill. 1979) (indictment dismissed because grand jury lost independence when prosecutor
failed to divulge exculpatory evidence); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F.
Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Ok. 1977) (indictment dismissed because prosecutor interfered with
suspect's due process rights); United States v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 579, 589
(W.D. Tex. 1977) (indictment dismissed because prosecutor failed to present grand jury with
exonerating interpretation of relevant law); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505, 513
(C.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827
(1977) (indictment dismissed when prosecutor failed to present grand jury with suspect's
charge that Government motive for prosecution was suspect); United States v. Gallo, 394 F.
Supp. 310, 315 (D. Conn. 1975) (indictment dismissed because prosecutor failed to present
full transcript of earlier grand jury proceedings to later grand jury).
30 350 U.S. 359, 360 n.1. The Government accused Costello of violating § 145(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939. 53 STAT. 63 (1939).
"' 15 Cal.3d 248, 539 P.2d 792, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1975). The Johnson opinion generated
considerable commentary. See, e.g., Note, District Attorney's Duty to Inform Grand Jury
of Exculpatory Evidence, 65 CAL. L. REV. 382 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Duty to Inform];
Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 11; Note, District Attorney is Under an Implied Statutory
Duty to Inform Grand Jury of Exculpatory Evidence, 25 CATH. U.L. REv. 648 (1976); Note,
The Prosecutor's Duty to Present Exculpatory Evidence to an Indicting Grand Jury, 75
MICH. L. REV. 1514 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Indicting Grand Jury]; Note, Johnson v.
Superior Court. The Future of the Grand Jury Indictment in California, 3 PEPP. L. REV. 365
(1976).
32 CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1970). A California grand jury need not hear
evidence favorable to a defendant. Id The grand jury must, however, weigh all the evidence
submitted for its consideration. Id. A California grand jury must also order the prosecutor
to produce any evidence that the grand jury believes may exculpate a defendant. Id.
15 Cal.3d at 255, 539 P.2d at 796, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
3H4d
' Id. Ironically, earlier California courts had used the statute relied on by Johnson to
justify denial to suspects of an opportunity to testify before grand juries. See Duty to In-
form, supra note 31, at 384 n.13.
See note 28 supra.
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several states have statutes with language similar to the California
statute.3 1
The federal criminal justice system does not have a statute like the
California rule that authorizes a grand jury to request exculpatory evi-
dence. Federal courts that force a prosecutor to divulge exculpatory evi-
dence to a grand jury justify their decisions as appropriate controls over
prosecutorial misconduct. 8 The Second Circuit's decision in United
States v. Ciambrone39 is the only federal finding at the circuit level that
suggests a prosecutor must divulge exculpatory information to a grand
jury. In dicta, the Ciambrone court suggested that although a prosecutor
is free to selectively present evidence to a grand jury, a prosecutor may
not knowingly mislead a grand jury or engage in other tactics that pre-
judice a suspect." To reach its conclusion, the court relied on a line of
Second Circuit cases which culminated in United States v. Estepa.1 The
Estepa court held that a prosecutor may not present hearsay evidence to
a grand jury when direct evidence is available, nor may a prosecutor
mislead the grand jury into believing that hearsay testimony is actually
eyewitness testimony.'2 Rather than give the Estepa rule constitutional
standing, the Second Circuit justified its holding in Estepa as an exten-
sion of its supervisory power over the district courts. 3 The facts in the
Ciambrone case, however, did not warrant dismissal of an indictment."
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit intimated that a court may exercise
supervisory power in some circumstances to dismiss an indictment when
a prosecutor withholds evidence from a grand jury."5
A few federal courts have agreed with the Ciambrone opinion and
have actually dismissed indictments. 6 None of the courts that have
dismissed indictments address the Supreme Court's holding in Costello
' See Indicting Grand Jury, supra note 31, at 1537 n.1ll (1977) (list of statutes with
language similar to CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1970)).
See note 29 supra.
601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979). See generally Note, Prosecuting Attorney Generally Not
Obligated to Discover and Present Evidence Favorable to the Defense, 11 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
359 (1980).
40 601 F.2d at 623.
" 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
2 Id at 1136-37. Several cases foreshadowed the Estepa opinion. See, e.g., United
States v. Leibowitz, 420 F.2d 39, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1969) (indictments subject to dismissal if ob-
tained principally upon hearsay evidence presented to grand jury when direct testimony
was available, and dismissal necessary to protect integrity of judicial process); United
States v. Malofsky, 388 F.2d 288, 289 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1017 (1968)
(prosecutor should not present excessive hearsay evidence to grand jury); United States v.
Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 940, cert. dismissed as im-
providently granted, 389 U.S. 80 (1967) (hearsay evidence should only be presented to grand
jury when direct testimony unfeasible).
" 471 F.2d at 1136-37.
" 601 F.2d at 623.
45 Id.
"' See note 29 supra.
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that a court should not dismiss a facially valid indictment because the
grand jury heard inadequate evidence.' Each opinion justifies its in-
terference with the grand jury's decision to indict by reasoning that
because a prosecutor failed to present exculpatory evidence to a grand
jury, the grand jury could not independently assess a suspect's alleged
guilt.'8 As the Costello Court recognized, however, a grand jury can in-
dict on little or no evidence.'9 Given the Costello ruling, a court that
dismisses a validly returned indictment is more guilty of interfering
with the independence of a grand jury than a prosecutor who presents a
slanted case to the grand jury. 0
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gerstein v. Pugh' provides another
troublesome precedent for courts that require divulgence of exculpatory
evidence to grand juries. The Gerstein Court held that the Constitution
does not require the determination of probable cause for prosecution in
an adversarial setting." The Court reasoned that an informal proceeding
was reliable enough to satisfy fourth amendment protections because a
probable cause determination does not require the resolution of conflic-
ting evidence that a reasonable doubt or preponderance standard de-
mands. 3 Since a grand jury can adequately determine probable cause
without careful examination of conflicting evidence, a requirement that a
prosecutor present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury is inconsistent
with Gerstein.
Even if courts accept the premise that they can dismiss indictments
due to a prosecutor's failure to present exculpatory evidence, defense
counsel must surmount several obstacles to gain dismissal. Counsel must
initially identify evidence that the prosecutor presented to the grand
jury. Although the states do not uniformly require recording,5' the
', 350 U.S. at 363. See note 29 supra.
" See note 29 supra.
350 U.S. at 363 (1956).
Cf. Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301, 1302-03 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice, 1978)
(facially valid grand jury indictment not subject to dismissal even if based on perjured
testimony). See text accompanying notes 21-29 & 46-49 supra.
5, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The Gerstein Court considered whether a person held for trial
under a prosecutor's information could constitutionally demand a judicial determination of
probable cause before pretrial incarceration. Id. at 105.
u Id. at 123. The Court held that although a judicial probable cause determination was
necessary, an adversarial proceeding was not necessary. Id. at 126.
Id. at 121.
" Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 340 (West 1969) (as amended 1974) (court
reporter required to record grand jury proceedings); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.855(c) (1977)
(grand jury transcripts not generally subject to disclosure but statements made by defend-
ant should be disclosed); OHIO R. CRIM. P. 6(E) (grand jury transcript may be made, but
defendant only allowed access by court order) with, ILL. S. CT. Rule 412, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110A, § 412 (iii) (Smith-Hurd) (as amended 1976) (State must provide certain records of
grand jury proceedings to defendant who requests records) as construed by People v.
Holman, 19 Ill. App. 3d 544, 546-47, 311 N.E.2d 696, 698 (1974) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §
412 does not require state to record all grand jury proceedings).
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federal government must record all federal grand jury proceedings.'
Assuming a record of grand jury proceedings exists, defense counsel
must overcome a tradition of grand jury secrecy"6 and demonstrate to a
court "particularized need" for access to the material.
5 7
If defense counsel can convince the court that the defendant has a
reasonable need for the grand jury transcript, counsel must then iden-
tify exculpatory evidence in the prosecutor's possession that the pro-
secutor failed to present to the grand jury. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure requires that the Government, upon defendant's
request, permit a defendant to inspect or copy documents or other
tangible items within government control. 8 The Government must allow
a defendant access to any item that is material to the defendant's
preparation for trial or that the Government intends to use in its case-in-
chief.5 The same requirement applies to results of scientific or medical
tests within the Government's control."0 Although Rule 16 does not re-
quire disclosure of government lists of prospective witnesses"' or grand
jury transcripts,62 the rule provides defense counsel with a limited op-
portunity to search for exculpatory evidence that a prosecutor arguably
should have presented to a grand jury.
Defense counsel who wishes to use the discovery provisions of Rule
16 must contend with restrictions the Jencks Act imposes on his investi-
gation. 3 Under the Act's provisions, a statement by a prosecution
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1).
See note 13 supra. See also, Kaufman, The Grand Jury-Its Role and Its Powers, 17
F.R.D. 331, 333 (1955). Grand juries proceed in secret to prevent unprosecuted criminal from
intimidating grand jury witnesses and to protect the innocent from public suspicion. Id.
" Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966) (defense counsel required to show
particularized need for access to grand jury transcripts); United States v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958) (grand jury secrecy suspended only on showing of particularized
need by defendant); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(3). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (discovery of
grand jury proceedings permissible at court's discretion).
"FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a}{1)(C).
59 Id.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a}(1)(D).
' See United States v. Chaplinski, 579 F.2d 373, 375 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cerL
denied, 439 U.S. 1050 (1979); United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 708 (8th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 964 (1979). The granting of the defense's request for a list of adverse
witnesses is a matter of judicial discretion. 579 F.2d at 708.
62 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(3). See note 57 supra.
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976). Congress passed the Jencks Act in response to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957) (defendant entitled to in-
spect all written F.B.I. reports bearing on testimony by government witnesses at trial). See
S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reprinted in [1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 1861, 1862 [cited hereinafter as SENATE REPORT]. Congress wished to ensure that
courts would not construe Jencks to allow a defendant to broadly search government files for
impeachment evidence. SENATE REPORT, supra, at 1862. Specifically, Congress intended that
the Jencks Act allow only disclosure of a witness's statements to the Government or the
grand jury that related to the witness's trial testimony. Id Because the relevance of a
witness's pretrial statements to the witness's trial testimony becomes apparent only after
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witness to a government agent is not subject to discovery until the
witness testifies on direct examination at trial."' The Act also prevents
pretrial discovery of statements by a government witness before a
grand jury. 5 After the witness testifies, a defendant may move to force
the Government to produce all the witness's statements to the Govern-
ment that relate to the testimony."6 Disclosure of exculpatory evidence
at this stage is probably too late for a defendant who would attack an in-
dictment because the prosecutor did not present evidence to the grand
jury. A trial court that has already begun a trial on the merits is unlikely
to dismiss the indictment and end the trial when defense counsel can
easily present the purportedly exculpatory evidence to the trier of fact.
6 7
Moreover, considerations of judicial economy might prevent a court
from dismissing an indictment when a prosecutor could return to the
grand jury and secure a new indictment despite the presentation of ad-
ditonal exculpatory evidence. 6
The Supreme Court's opinion in Brady v. Maryland69 establishes a
rule for states which substantially conforms to the narrow requirements
that Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure imposes on the
United States. The Brady rule requires that a prosecutor divulge ex-
culpatory evidence to a defendant when the defendant requests specific
material.7' Evidence subject to Brady disclosure must be favorable to a
defendant and material to a defendant's guilt or punishment. 2 The Court
the testimony occurs, Congress restricted disclosure of a government witness's pretrial
statements until after the witness's direct testimony at trial. Id at 1863. Some states have
promulgated provisions that essentially mirror the Jencks Act. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-3213 (1974); N.C. GEN. STAT § 15A-904(a) (1978); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 7.26; N.D. R. CRIM. P.
16(h); Wyo. R. CRIM P. 18(c).
" 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1976).
' Id. § 3500(e)(3).
" Id. § 3500(b). See note 63 supra.
V' See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 574 F.2d 1274, 1277 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant con-
stitutionally protected by opportunity to present full case at trial on merits); Loraine v.
United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir. 1968) (defendant's constitutional rights fully pro-
tected when permitted to expose all facts bearing on guilt or innocence at trial on merits).
" A prosecutor can seek a new indictment after dismissal of an earlier indictment for
procedural irregularities. See Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942) (defendant's conviction
reversed due to defective prosecution procedure but defendant subject to reindictment con-
forming to constitutional requirements). See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558 (1979)
(approval of Hill v. Texas position on reindictment); State v. Gieffels, 554 P.2d 460, 461
(Alaska 1976) (reindictment allowed after dismissal of indictment due to prosecutor's failure
to present exculpatory evidence to grand jury); State v. Bussiere, 118 N.H. 659, 392 A.2d
151, 155 (1978) (reindictment allowed after defectively drafted indictment dismissed).
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
7o Id at 87.
7' Id. The Court based its holding on broad due process grounds, establishing a rule
that applies to the federal government as well as the states. See United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (extension of Brady rule applies to federal as well as state trials);
United States v. Friedman, 593 F.2d 109, 120 (9th Cir. 1979).
2 373 U.S. at 87.
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in United States v. Agurs" widened the Brady rule to include cases in
which the defendant makes only a general request for Brady material or
no request at all for exculpatory evidence in a prosecutor's possession. 4
Neither Agurs nor Brady provides complete assurance that a defendant
will discover all exculpatory material in a prosecutor's file. The Brady
opinion requires divulgence only of material specifically described by
the defendant.75 Thus, Brady precludes discovery of evidence the
defense is unaware exists. The prosecutor need release only evidence
which is obviously exculpatory to satisfy the Agurs ruling."6 Whether
the evidence discovered under Brady or Agurs must be divulged before
trial remains unresolved." Divulgence during trial is less valuable than
427 U.S. 97 (1976).
' Id. at 110-11.
7 373 U.S. at 87.
427 U.S. at 112.
" Some courts have held that a prosecutor need not release exculpatory information
before trial. See, e.g., United States v. McCord, 509 F.2d 891, 893-94 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975) (no due process violation when Government failed to comply with
pretrial discovery order); Williams v. Wolff, 473 F.2d 1049, 1051 (8th Cir. 1973) (due process
not violated when Government failed to deliver autopsy report before trial); State v.
Folkens, 281 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1979); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, -, 371
A.2d 468, 484 (1977); Jones v. State, 568 P.2d 837, 853 (Wyo. 1977) (Wyo. R. CRIM. P. 18(c)
construed).
Other courts have required a prosecutor to divulge exculpatory evidence to a defend-
ant at an appropriate time, either before or during trial. See, e.g., United States v. Ziper-
stein, 601 F.2d 281, 291 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1031 (1980); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1346 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); Williams v.
Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1105 (1969); People v. Bot-
tom, 76 Misc. 2d 525, __ , 351 N.Y.S.2d 328, 333-34 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (due process violated
when evidence turned over too late for defendant's use at trial).
Courts that require a prosecutor to divulge exculpatory evidence to a defendant before
trial often direct the prosecutor to offer the evidence whenever divulgence might further a
fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1346 (7th Cir. 1979); Williams
v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968). A standard that requires pretrial divulgence to
provide a fair trial gives only limited assistance to a defendant who wishes to challenge a
grand jury indictment. Pretrial divulgence of exculpatory evidence may be unnecessary to
further a fair trial yet critical to a defendant's claim that the prosecutor failed to reveal ex-
culpatory evidence to an indicting grand jury.
A few courts insist that a prosecutor surrender exculpatory evidence to a defendant at
the earliest possible moment. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239, 1257
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stans v. Gagliardi, 485 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Government obligated to disclose exculpatory evidence regardless of chronological bound-
aries); State v. Sahlie, 90 S.D. 682, -, 245 N.W.2d 476, 478-79 (1976) (prosecutor must
release exculpatory evidence to defendant long enough before trial to allow defendant's in-
spection). Cf. A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND PRO-
CEDURE BEFORE TRIAL, § 2.1(c) (Approved Draft 1970) (prosecutor should disclose material
and information to defense that tends to negate guilt of accused) [hereinafter cited as
DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE]; DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE, supra § 2.2(a) (prosecutor must per-
form obligations under § 2.1 as soon as possible after charges filed against accused). See
generally JUSTICE IS THE CRIME, supra note 11, at 247-363 (1972) (state by state summary of
pretrial discovery rules); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 8, 123-29 (1966) (right of accused to prosecutor's
evidence in state courts).
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pretrial discovery to defense counsel seeking to quash an indictment.
Once a trial has begun, a court may be reluctant to forego the opportun-
ity to make a final resolution of the charges.
Defense counsel must overcome another obstacle in arguing for
divulgence of exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Counsel must
define for the court what the prosecutor should consider as exculpatory
evidence. Courts have yet to develop a reliable standard. 8 The Agurs
Court held that a prosecutor must divulge exculpatory evidence if' the
evidence raises a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt that does not ex-
ist without the evidence. 9 According to the Agurs opinion, only con-
" In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court described three
circumstances in which a court might require a prosecutor to divulge exculpatory informa-
tion to a defendant. The standard of materiality that the Agurs Court imposed for determin-
ing exculpatory evidence varies according to the situation. When a prosecutor knows that a
prosecution witness has committed perjury at trial, the prosecutor must disclose evidence
of the perjury to the defendant if a reasonable likelihood exists that disclosure would have
affected the judgment of the factfinder. Id. at 103; United States v. Hedgeman, 564 F.2d 763,
766 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1978) (new trial denied because disclosure
would probably not have affected jury's judgment). A prosecutor's disclosure of exculpatory
evidence due to perjury at trial has little relevance to a defendant who wishes to attack a
grand jury indictment instead of a criminal conviction. Disclosure of exculpatory evidence
due to a trial witness's perjury, however, may indicate that the prosecutor failed to con-
tradict the witness's perjured testimony to the grand jury, and thus provide grounds for an
attack on the underlying indictment. A prosecutor must prevent perjured testimony from
materially tainting indictments. United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir.
1979); United States v. Smith, 552 F.2d 257, 261 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Basurto, 497
F.2d 781, 785 (9th Cir. 1974).
The second situation described by the Agurs Court is a refusal by the prosecutor to
reveal evidence specificially requested by a defendant. 427 U.S. at 104-06. The standard of
materiality to determine whether requested evidence should be disclosed is, as in the case
of perjured testimony, whether the undisclosed evidence might affect the outcome of the
trial. Id. See also United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199, 1205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 821 (1978) (new trial denied when undisclosed evidence unlikely to affect outcome). Dis-
closure of evidence that a defendant specifically requests for trial might assist a defendant's
attack on a grand jury indictment. A defendant might claim that the prosecutor should have
presented the evidence to the grand jury. Nevertheless, evidence that might be material to
the outcome of a trial might not be material to the outcome of a grand jury deliberation. A
grand jury may decide to indict even if a suspect does not appear guilty by the
preponderance of evidence or reasonable doubt evidentiary standard used in trials. See note
15 supra. Thus, by requiring a showing that evidence requested by the defense might in-
fluence the outcome of the trial, the standard of materiality that the Agurs Court applies to
evidence that the defendant requests limits the defense's opportunity to colorably challenge
the indictment.
In the absence of perjury at trial or a specific defense request for evidence, a pro-
secutor need only divulge exculpatory information to the defense if the evidence creates a
reasonable doubt in defendant's favor. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976);
United States v. Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752, 760 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). In
gaining access to information that raises a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, defense
counsel might make a strong case that the prosecutor should have presented the evidence
to the grand jury. Defense counsel, however, might never learn of evidence that falls short
of raising a reasonable doubt at trial but that the prosecutor should have presented the
grand jury regardless.
,1 427 U.S. at 112.
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sideration of the entire trial record can determine what evidence might
raise a doubt in a defendant's favor." Unlike a reviewing court, a pro-
secutor who approaches a grand jury cannot rely on a trial record. A pro-
secutor cannot always guess what evidence might convince a grand jury
that probable cause does not exist to prosecute a crime. Evidence which,
in retrospect, might have swayed a grand jury can easily be ignored by a
prosecutor sincerely convinced of a suspect's guilt." Courts that insist
on disclosure of exculpatory evidence provide little guidance by direct-
ing a prosecutor to disclose evidence which tends to negate guilt82 or to
present evidence that gives a grand jury an opportunity to independently
evaluate a suspect's conduct.83 Similarly, a directive by a court that a
prosecutor must present only evidence that is clearly exculpatory does
not help a prosecutor identify such evidence."4 As investigation and
prosecution proceed, evidence may assume a significance that the pro-
secutor did not initially perceive.
A defendant seeking divulgence of exculpatory evidence to a grand
jury faces a final hurdle even if defense counsel can present a workable
standard for evidence that a prosecutor should reveal. Courts are reluc-
tant to add to criminal procedure another time-consuming level of
pretrial review. If indictments can be dismissed based upon a pro-
secutor's failure to divulge, competent defense counsel will rarely fail to
move for dismissal. In addition, defense counsel will more frequently at-
tempt discovery of material in a prosecutor's possession before trial and
more pretrial hearings will result. Moreover, prosecutors in states that
allow a prosecutor to initiate prosecution either by information or indict-
ment may proceed by information and submit the State's case to a pro-
bable cause hearing by a magistrate. 6 A suspect has due process rights
80 1&
"I See United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1040 (D. Md. 1976) (recognizing pro-
secutor's integral part in presenting case to grand jury); Keeny & Walsh, supra note 16, at
548. See also text accompanying note 16 supra.
"z United States v. Provenzano, 440 F. Supp. 561, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See also United
States v. Martin, 480 F. Supp. 880, 886 (S.D. Tex. 1979); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp.
1336, 1353 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
8 See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966) (judgment of what material
might be helpful to defense most properly made by defense advocate). See also Xydas v.
United States, 445 F.2d 660, 667 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971). In Xydas the
trial court failed to find exculpatory evidence for disclosure under Brady upon examination
of the grand jury record. The appellate court, however, found that the record did contain
evidence in the defendant's favor. Id. A prosecutor, therefore, can fail to recognize ex-
culpatory evidence as easily as a presumably impartial trial judge.
" United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (D. Md. 1976); State v. Bell, 60
Haw. 241, __ , 589 P.2d 517, 521 (1978).
8" See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956); United States v. Kennedy,
564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977) (court will not allow a hearing after each indictment).
" Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 807, 812
n.24 (1972) (listing of all state statutes that allow prosecutor to proceed either by indictment
or information) [hereinafter cited as Dash]; Prosecutor's Duty, supra note 11, at 589 n.54
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in an adversarial setting at a post-information hearing which are not ap-
plicable at a grand jury hearing." Nevertheless, a suspect does not have
access to all exculpatory evidence a prosecutor might possess. In a state
that allows prosecution either by indictment or information, a rule re-
quiring divulgence of exculpatory evidence to a grand jury has little use
if a similar rule does not also apply to preliminary hearings to determine
probable cause.
The grand jury remains a living institution in American juris-
prudence. The Supreme Court's opinion in Costello v. United States8
protects the grand jury's discretion to indict under most circumstances. 9
So long as Costello remains a controlling opinion, a prosecutor can have
no legally enforceable duty to divulge exculpatory evidence to a grand
jury. A prosecutor need only convince a grand jury to indict. He need
not also convince a court that a grand jury's indictment was fair. Given
the current state of the law, any contrary conclusion short of a Supreme
Court decision or statutory authority is neither legally nor pragmati-
cally binding.
MARK EDWARD CAVANAGH
(1977) (listing of state statutes or constitutions that allow prosecutor to proceed either by in-
dictment or information).
' Johnson v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 248, 256-57, 5 9 P.2d 792, 797, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32,
37 (1975) (Mosk, J., concurring). See also Dash, supra note 86, at 807-18 (1972) (exhaustive
discussion of implications of system allowing prosecution by either indictment or informa-
tion).
350 U.S. 359 (1956).
" Id. at 363.
" See text accompanying notes 21-27 & 46-50 supra.
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